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I. INTRODUCTION
For twenty-five years or more we have been debating the proper role of
alternative dispute resolution ("ADR")1 in our system of justice. While the
birth of the modem ADR a movement is often linked to the 1976 Pound Confer-
ence,3 heated discussions as to the desirability of ADR continued long after that
date.4 Although many have heralded non-litigation forms of dispute resolution
as quicker, cheaper, more empowering, and otherwise superior to litigation,5
others have expressed concern that ADR, or at least particular forms of ADR,
may be detrimental to the public interest, 6 may harm minorities or women,7 and
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Personally, I prefer the phrase "appropriate" dispute resolution to "alternative" dispute
resolution, making the point that the so-called "alternative" has arrived. See also Albie M.
Davis & Howard Gadlin, Mediators Gain Trust the Old-Fashioned Way - We Earn It!, 4
NEGOT. J. 55, 62 (1988) (coining the term "appropriate" dispute resolution); Janet Reno,
Lawyers as Problem-Solvers: Keynote Address to the AALS, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 5, 8 (1999)
(urging lawyers to engage in "appropriate dispute resolution"). Cf. Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli,
Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 297, 300 n.2
(1996) (opting for the term "alternative" to reflect ADR's recent arrival on the legal scene).
2 In a prior article, I cautioned that the term "ADR" is no longer particularly useful in that
differences between mediation, binding arbitration, and other techniques are so great. Jean
R. Stemlight, Is Binding Arbitration a Form of ADR?: An Argument that the Term "ADR"
Has Begun to Outlive Its Usefulness, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 97. Yet, I find myself using the
term. At least I predicted that this might happen. Id. at 110 (explaining that "[t]he term is
still useful where we seek to refer to those dispute resolution processes other than
litigation").
3 In particular, Frank Sander's speech at that conference introducing the concept of the
"multi-door courthouse" has been identified by many as a key event in the birth of modern
ADR. See Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 79, 111 (1976).
4 For a reflection on the development of ADR, see Stempel, supra note 1.
5 See, e.g., STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIA-
TION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 8 (3d ed. 1999) (summarizing goals of ADR); LEONARD L.
RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DisPuTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 2 (2d ed. 1997) (list-
ing five motives inspiring interest in alternatives to litigation).
6 See, e.g., Harry Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99
HARv. L. REV. 668, 677 (1986) (stating a fear of pushing ADR into areas of novel legal
issues and public interest without the "checks of government institutions"); Owen M. Fiss,
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may not in fact be cheaper or quicker than litigation.8 These sorts of debates
took place as jurisdiction after jurisdiction considered whether to implement
particular forms of ADR as part of their federal or state courts, or administra-
tive agencies.
The recent conference at the William S. Boyd School of Law, University
of Nevada, Las Vegas, of which this essay is a part, reflects that discussions
regarding ADR have moved to a new level. We are no longer debating whether
jurisdictions should adopt new and unconventional forms of dispute resolution.
Rather, while debates continue, they recognize that ADR has clearly arrived in
a big way. Many, if not most, federal and state jurisdictions include ADR
methods in their court rules. 9 Federal and state administrative agencies are
increasingly relying on non-litigious methods to resolve disputes.1° More and
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (arguing that ADR and settlement undermine
the purpose of a civil litigation system when dealing with cases of unequal bargaining
power, parties who are unable to provide authoritative rights to settle, and cases with long
term agreements needing the continued presence of judicial involvement); Geraldine Szott
Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 395 (1999) (discussing the inability of employment discrimination cases settled
through arbitration to address the public interest of ending workplace discrimination because
such settlements lack the capacity to yield uniform or precedential results, to deter wrongdo-
ers, or to educate and form public values).
7 See, e.g., Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE
L.J. 1545 (1991) (asserting mediation's inability to empower women because the process de-
emphasizes past experiences and fault or right-based claims, and creates a false impression
of an equal power balance between disputing parties, thus embodying an even more danger-
ous and oppressive process for women than adversarial litigation); Richard Delgado et al.,
Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution,
1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359, 1391 (claiming that informal processes' allowance for "partici-
pants' emotional and behavioral idiosyncrasies" creates an atmosphere conducive to prejudi-
cial behavior while the formality of court proceedings stifles such behavior and "increases
the minority group member's sense of control").
8 JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUA-
TION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT xxxiv (1996) (often referred to as "The Rand
Report") (finding "no strong statistical evidence that ... time to disposition, litigation costs,
or attorney views of fairness or satisfaction with case management [were] significantly
affected" utilizing mediation or neutral evaluation programs).
9 See, e.g., The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58, 652(a)
(requiring each district court to have litigants in all civil cases consider using ADR, and to
provide at least one ADR process to litigants); NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. McEWEN ET
AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE app. B (1999 & Supp. 2000) (listing territory,
state, and federal legislation on mediation). See also ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA
STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR
JUDGES AND LAWYERS 15-17 (1996) (providing a comprehensive table listing all ADR
processes provided by federal district courts).
10 For good discussions of federal programs, see Jeffrey M. Senger, Turning the Ship of
State, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 79 (listing federal agencies utilizing various ADR processes,
including the U.S. Postal Service, federal Justice Department, Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission, and the Air Force); Daniel Marcus & Jeffrey M. Senger, ADR and the
Federal Government: Not Such Strange Bedfellows After All, 66 Mo. L. REv. 709 (2001)
(listing additional agencies utilizing various ADR processes, including the Department of
Health and Human Services, Environmental Protection Agency and Community Conflict
Resolution Centers).
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more, disputants are required to use mediation11 or another form of ADR,12
rather than just being offered the opportunity to use it if they so desire. Today,
it is clear that far more disputes in the United States are resolved through nego-
tiation, mediation, and arbitration than through trial.13 But, the arrival of ADR
does not mean that the questioning and critiquing has ended or must end, but
rather that it should take a different form.
The remarks of the speakers at this conference all reflect this new reality:
that ADR is an important part of our existing system of dispute resolution.
Professor Stephen Subrin, who highlights his prior "traditionalist," "formalist"
and "pro-adjudication" credentials,14 states: "I think I now realize that media-
tion is a major portion of the new era of civil procedure. Moreover, I have
come to believe that, despite some lingering reservations, this is a positive
development in the evolution of American civil procedure."15 While Professor
Subrin finds the tremendous growth of mediation to be salutary for many rea-
sons, he also pleads with "judges to spend an increased portion of their time in
" ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 9 (listing forty-six states that legislate mandatory media-
tion in various legal arenas). See also John P. McCrory, Mandated Mediation of Civil Cases
in State Courts: A Litigant's Perspective on Program Model Choices, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 813, 850-51 (1999) (asserting "the responsibility of courts that mandate liti-
gants to mediation to provide a high-quality mediation program" and providing objectives to
evaluate these programs in order to ensure their high-quality); Bobbi McAdoo & Art Hin-
shaw, The Challenge of Institutionalizing Alternative Dispute Resolution: Attorney Perspec-
tives on the Effect of Rule 17 on Civil Litigation in Missouri, 67 Mo. L. REV. 473 (2002)
(discussing attitudes of attorneys toward mediation in a jurisdiction where it is not typically
mandated).
12 Although courts and government agencies generally do not, and constitutionally likely
could not, mandate binding arbitration, they do sometimes mandate non-binding arbitration
or early neutral evaluation. See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 651-58 (2001) (providing that federal courts shall not mandate binding arbitration absent
parties' consent). See also Jean R. Sterlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the
Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial,
Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REv. 1 (1997).
13 See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regula-
tion of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1340-41 (1994). As Professor Subrin has noted,
it is frustratingly difficult to find good data on the amount of ADR that is taking place in this
country. Stephen N. Subrin, A Traditionalist Looks at Mediation: It's Here to Stay and
Much Better Than I Thought, 3 NEV. L.J. 196, 199 (2003). See also Marc Galanter, Con-
tract in Court; Or Almost Everything You May or May Not Want to Know About Contract
Litigation, 2001 Wis. L. REv. 577, 589 (complaining about difficulty of ascertaining good
information on how contract disputes are resolved by processes outside courts' mandate).
However, we do know that most cases settle in both federal and state courts. Only 2.2% of
federal civil cases reached the trial stage in 2000. Annual Report of the Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts at tbl. C-4 (Sept. 30, 2000). Some of these
resolutions are due to cases being disposed of on pretrial motions. See Stephen C. Yeazell,
The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 631
(explaining that civil procedure reforms in the last seventy-five years have led to pretrial
processes playing an increasingly important role). Still, it remains true that about seventy
percent of cases do settle. Galanter & Cahill, supra, at 1339-40.
14 Subrin, supra note 13, at 196-98.
15 Id. at 198.
Winter 2002/2003]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
their more traditional role."' 6 Similarly, Professor Edward Brunet takes the
significant presence of mediation for granted, and goes on to address questions
as to what the differences should be between old-fashioned settlement confer-
ences and more modem mediations. 7 Professor Paul Carrington, while attack-
ing the continued growth of mandatory arbitration, clearly recognizes that the
phenomenon has been approved by the Supreme Court and is here to stay, at
least absent Congressional action.' 8
In another symposium with which I am familiar, participants similarly
based their remarks on the premise that ADR has very much arrived. Professor
Deborah Hensler's lead article in the Journal of Dispute Resolution sharply
criticizes our heightened reliance on mandatory mediation.' 9 Asserting that
there is no good empirical evidence that mediation is either cheaper or quicker
than litigation, 20 she further contends there is no adequate evidence that dispu-
tants prefer mediation to litigation. 2' Here she draws on the procedural justice
literature to suggest that disputants may prefer a hearing before a neutral deci-
sion maker to a facilitated negotiation.22 Various other commentators in the
same symposium take for granted our system' s increasing embrace of ADR and
then discuss how we should respond to that phenomenon. For example, Profes-
sor Judith Resnik criticizes our move away from adjudication and trial and
toward both managerial judging and settlement, arguing that whereas judges
prefer settlement to trial, disputants in fact prefer trials or trial-like procedures
such as arbitration. 23 Researchers Craig McEwen and Rochelle Wissler simi-
larly took note of our system's move toward mediation but respond more favor-
ably, arguing that mediated settlements are often superior to non-assisted
16 Id. In particular, he urges that, especially as the amount of mediation increases, judges
should "return to presiding over trials instead of expending time and energy on ad hoc case
management and luring litigants to settlement." Id.
17 Edward Brunet, Judicial Mediation and Signaling, 3 NEV. L.J. 232 (2003).
18 Paul D. Carrington, Self-Deregulation, The "National Policy" of the Supreme Court, 3
NEV. L.J. 259 (2003).
19 Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It's Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology, 2002 J.
Disp. REsOL. 81, 94 (suggesting that the move to use mandatory court-connected mediation
has been based on a false theory that litigants preferred non-adversarial methods of dispute
resolution, when in actuality litigants prefer to have their disputes resolved on the basis of
fact and law by a third-party neutral). For another recent critique, see Bryant G. Garth,
Tilting the Justice System: From ADR as Idealistic Movement to a Segmented Market in
Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 927, 950-51 (2002) (asserting that, by emphasiz-
ing ADR, "[w]e have created a segmented and hierarchical system skewed dramatically
toward business litigants and a few other players - notably a few sectors of the personal
injury bar").
20 Hensler, supra note 19, at 81.
21 Hensler, supra note 19, at 84 ("In any event, neither statistical data about claiming rates
nor public opinion surveys about lawyers lead directly to the conclusion that left to their own
devices most Americans would prefer mediation to adversarial litigation and adjudication.").
22 Id. at 85-96.
23 Judith Resnik, Mediating Preferences: Litigant Preferences for Process and Judicial
Preferences for Settlement, 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 155, 163 [hereinafter Resnik, Mediating
Preferences]. See also Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming
the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 944-49 (2000) [hereinafter Resnik, Trial
as Error] (citing examples from as early as the 1950s of a push by judges to use pretrial
conferences as a vehicle to promote settlement).
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settlements.2 4 Professor Lisa Bingham, drawing on research from outside the
court setting, urges that facilitative and transformative mediation can provide
disputants with a useful alternative to adjudication." Finally, Professor Nancy
Welsh, reviewing the same procedural justice literature examined by Professor
Hensler, urges that we should take procedural justice concerns into account as
we design mediation, litigation, and all forms of dispute resolution processes.2 6
Finally, I had the luxury of spending much of the Winter 2002 semester
thinking big thoughts about dispute resolution, examining what it has looked
like throughout time and within various societies.2 7 Reviewing some of the
anthropological and other literature regarding other societies' resolution of dis-
putes,28 I saw that historically many societies have placed far greater emphasis
on harmony and healing, and far less emphasis on individualistic adversarial
approaches, than we do in the United States today.29 I also saw that a society's
24 Craig A. McEwen & Roselle L. Wissler, Finding Out If It Is True: Comparing Mediation
and Negotiation Through Research, 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 131, 136 (stating that, given the
fact that most cases settle prior to trial, it is preferable to compare non-mediated settlements
with mediated settlements instead of comparing litigated with mediated resolutions).
25 Lisa B. Bingham, Why Suppose? Let's Find Out: A Public Policy Research Program on
Dispute Resolution, 2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 101, 102 (also urging that further research needs to
be done).
26 Nancy A. Welsh, Disputants' Decision Control in Court-Connected Mediation: A Hollow
Promise Without Procedural Justice, 2002 J. Disp. REsOL. 179, 180 [hereinafter Welsh,
Disputants' Decision Control]. See also Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-
Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?,
6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 78-92 (2001) (suggesting steps that should be taken to ensure
that mediation enhances rather than diminishes self-determination, a component asserted by
procedural justice studies to be imperative to the perception of a fair process); Nancy A.
Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got to Do With It?, 79
WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 860 (2001) [hereinafter Welsh, Making Deals] (arguing that court-
connected third-party processes "should and must be judged against the standard of procedu-
ral justice").
27 1 owe this luxury to a development leave afforded by the University of Missouri-
Columbia.
28 Some of the most compelling works I read include 2 THE PoLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE
(Richard L. Abel ed., 1982); CONFLICT RESOLUTION: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES
(Kevin Avruch et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter CONFLICT RESOLUTION]; STUART HAMPSHIRE,
JUSTICE IS CONFLICT (2000); LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY (Laura Nader ed., 1969); MAR-
TIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981); and PETER STEIN,
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (1984).
29 See, e.g., CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 28 (including chapters discussing focus of
dispute resolution system on harmony and balance in African, Pacific Island, and Mexican
societies); Laura Nader, Styles of Court Procedure: To Make the Balance, in Law in Culture
and Society, supra note 28, at 69-91 (describing approach to dispute resolution taken by
Mexican Zapotec Indians as focused on keeping the society in balance and seeking to restore
personal relations to an equilibrium, and suggesting similarities to Korean system as
described by P.C. Hahm); Robert Yazzie, "Life Comes From It": Navajo Justice Concepts,
1994 N.M. L. REv. 175 (explaining that Navajo system of justice can best be described as
"horizontal," in contrast to the Western "vertical" system of justice; where the vertical sys-
tem relies on hierarchy and power to resolve disputes, the horizontal is instead best symbol-
ized by the circle, in which no authority has to determine what is true, and the goal is healing
and restoration rather than determining right and wrong); James A. Wall, Jr. & Ronda Rob-
erts Callister, Ho'oponopono: Some Lessons from Hawaiian Mediation, 11 NEGOT. J. 45, 47
(1995) (explaining that term "ho'oponopono," used to describe Hawaiian form of dispute
resolution, comes from concept of disentangling (as in fishing lines) and "putting things
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approach to dispute resolution will depend on a number of geographic, socio-
logical, historic, and other factors, and that the emphasis on harmony and com-
munity has both positive and negative aspects. 30
In pondering the comments of the various symposia participants, I find
myself attracted to aspects of each analysis. Thus, while the authors of these
comments often see their works as conflicting, I am instead searching for ways
to synthesize their perspectives. This attempt at synthesis leads me to offer five
insights regarding how a society should go about deciding what type of dispute
resolution process it ought to establish. These thoughts are quite preliminary,
and will need to be spelled out in further detail in future works.
II. FIVE INSIGHTS
A. It is a Mistake to Distinguish Litigation from Other Forms of Dispute
Resolution in an Either/Or Fashion
Many of us teach about various forms of dispute resolution as being dis-
tinct points, perhaps lying along a continuum. We often suggest, for example,
that processes vary, from negotiation to mediation to arbitration to litigation,
along such dimensions as binding/nonbinding, formality, and degree of party
control. 3' This imagery is useful, and I have used it myself. As we attempt to
right," such that the goal of the process is to acknowledge any wrongdoing with the attempt
to make things right again both spiritually and interpersonally, and ultimately to achieve
mutual forgiveness); SHAPIRO, supra note 28, at 14-15 (recognizing that, in societies charac-
terized by mutual interdependence, there is a tendency to select mediation rather than strictly
adjudicative approach, and that this can even occur within systems labeled as courts). See
also MICHAEL BARKUN, LAW WITHOUT SANCTIONS: ORDER IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES AND THE
WORLD COMMUNITY 7 (1968) (questioning the historic "command theory," which states that
law only exists within the presence of the State, by examining cultures in which disputes are
resolved without the centralized strong arm of the State as the enforcer).
30 See, e.g., Laura Nader, Harmony Models and the Construction of Law, in CONFLICT
RESOLUTION, supra note 28, at 41, 42 (suggesting that neither conflict nor harmony models
are inherently better or worse than one another, but rather that each system can serve good
and bad purposes, such as enhancing autonomy or controlling dissent); SHAPIRO, supra note
28, at 14-15 (describing how the importance of continued relationships leads many societies
or subsets of societies to decide against litigious processes and in favor of more harmonious
approaches).
31 The continuum provides a convenient format onto which one can lay out the various
processes for examination. See CHRISTOPHER MOORE, A GENERAL THEORY OF MEDIATION:
DYNAMICS, STRATEGIES, AND MOVES 3 (1983) (detailing a continuum of conflict manage-
ment and resolution approaches shifting from conflict avoidance, to cooperative problem
solving, to litigation, to violence); R. LAWRENCE DESSEM, PRETRIAL LITIGATION: LAW, POL-
ICY, AND PRACTICE 569 (1991) (explaining dispute resolution processes along a continuum
based on formality, expense, and party control). However, many other authors use more
complex formats stepping away from a strictly linear approach. For example, one text uses a
chart with various rows and columns to distinguish four primary and five hybrid dispute
resolution processes. GOLDBERG, supra note 5, at 4-5. See also RiSKIN & WESTBROOK,
supra note 5, at 3-10 (categorizing processes as adjudicative, consensual, or mixed, and also
reprinting the chart prepared by GOLDBERG, supra note 5); EDWARD A. DAUER, MANUAL OF
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ADR LAW AND PRACTICE § 5 (1996) (placing ADR processes on two
axes, depending on the level of control and responsibility of the neutral or the level of con-
trol and responsibility of the parties). As one renowned author stated, "there is no compre-
hensive or widely-accepted system for identifying, describing, or classifying" the various
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locate the various dispute resolution methods along these continua, we help
students define the key differences among the techniques.
Yet, these useful distinctions can also create the impression that the vari-
ous dispute resolution techniques being discussed are more distinct than they
really are. I concur with the point Professor Martin Shapiro made, over twenty
years ago, when he stated "mediation and litigation are invariably intimately
interconnected and interactive rather than distinct alternatives for conflict reso-
lution."32 Several of the Nevada symposium's speakers have also emphasized
this point. Professor Subrin argues that mediation can be used to explore legal
rights.3 3 He explains that whereas mediation has been criticized for being non-
legal and insufficiently emphasizing rights, in fact mediation allows disputants
and lawyers to explore their rights more fully than often would happen absent
mediation.3 4 Similarly, Professor Brunet emphasizes that "[b]ecause case eval-
uation from a judge is the essence of both judicial mediation and a settlement
conference, there is not a great deal of difference between these terms." 3
5
Thus, we see a blurring of the lines between dispute resolution processes. As
Brunet points out, a judge, through the course of various hearings, cannot help
but signal some of her intentions to the parties, thereby encouraging settlement.
Like these commentators, I see that an intertwining between litigation and
other forms of dispute resolution is inevitable. Some disputants will always
choose to settle their disputes, and there seems to be no way that a society
could force them to resolve the dispute through litigation rather than through
settlement.3 6 Just as settlements occur in the "shadow of the law, ' 37 that is,
that the possibility of a litigated solution is often what drives disputants to
resolve the dispute through mediation or negotiation, so too does litigation take
place in the shadow of settlement. 38 As lawyers and disputants litigate cases
they do, or at least should, always keep in mind the possibility of negotiation or
ADR processes. Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientation, Strategies and
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 H~Av. NEGOT. L. Rv. 7, 8 (1996).
32 SHAPIRO, supra note 28, at viii. Shapiro goes on to explain that whereas courts are con-
ventionally defined by their independence, adversarialness, decisions according to preexist-
ing rules, and winner-take-all decisions, these "propositions are incorrect, or at least
incomplete and misleading." Id. Instead, drawing on a series of examples from various
societies, he argues that mediation and litigation tend more toward blending into one
another, and ultimately concludes that courts are a mix of conflict resolution, social control,
and lawmaking. Id. at 63-64.
33 Subrin, supra note 13. He explains that "[i]ronically, mediation, which is accused of, or
applauded for, being lawless, frequently does much more to bring law to bear on facts than
traditional litigation." Id. at 218. As Professor Subrin notes, the term "medigation" is
inspired in part by the term "litigotiation," used by Marc Galanter and Mia Cahill. See
Galanter & Cahill, supra note 13, at 1342.
31 Subrin, supra note 13, at 218-21.
35 Brunet, supra note 17, at 238.
36 Even if a society were to forbid or discourage settlement once litigation had been initi-
ated, it would not seem feasible for a society to proscribe pre-filing settlements.
31 See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
38 See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2676 (1995) (noting
"'dialogic' or interactive relation between adjudication and settlement processes").
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mediation. 39 Thus, it is generally a mistake to consider that one form of dis-
pute resolution is entirely a substitute for others.
B. Despite the Entanglement of Various Forms of Dispute Resolution,
Significant Choices Must be Made Among the Forms of Dispute
Resolution
Recognizing that various forms of dispute resolution are intertwined by no
means implies that they are the same, or that it does not matter how a society
chooses to resolve its disputes. Clearly, various forms of dispute resolution
have different impacts on individual disputants and on society as a whole. The
dispute resolution methods not only vary across such dimensions as speed and
cost, but also vary with respect to the educational and psychological impact
they will have on the disputants, other closely related persons, and society as a
whole.
For example, when disputes are handled publicly, such as through litiga-
tion or a public facilitation, the disputes and their resolution will have an
impact upon all of society. This influence may be formal, through the setting
of precedent, or informal, through notifying members of the society how the
issues have been resolved. In contrast, when disputes are handled privately, for
example through a private negotiation or mediation, the outcome will have a
much smaller impact.4 ° As well, when disputes are resolved through adjudica-
tion, where one party wins and the other loses, the impact on disputants and the
community will be very different than if that same dispute were resolved
through a compromise. Depending on the societal goals, one approach may be
preferable to the other.
Thus, even though it may be impossible to make sharp delineations
between various forms of dispute resolution, it is clear that societies must make
self-conscious choices as to which dispute resolution methods should be pre-
ferred for particular disputes. We must also make choices as to how to regulate
these various forms of dispute resolution.
C. More Research is Needed Regarding What Disputants Want in a
Dispute Resolution System
Most of us would agree that it is important for disputants to feel that they
have been treated fairly and justly by society's dispute resolution systems.4'
39 See Dessem, supra note 31 (urging attorneys to "explore with clients ADR possibilities"
during the pre-trial stage). Binding arbitration is somewhat different, in that once a choice
has been made to resolve a dispute through binding arbitration, that dispute cannot be liti-
gated. However, even in this case, the alternative to litigation is intertwined with litigation
in that the courts often become involved either to order a dispute to arbitration or to enforce
an arbitral award. Also, disputants would have the option to transfer a case from litigation to
binding arbitration.
40 Of course, settlement need not necessarily be kept private. When settlements are publi-
cized, they may have a significant public impact. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 38, at
2681 (noting that when important settlements receive substantial news coverage, they may
have a public impact exceeding that of reported decisions).
41 Professor Subrin states "it is critical that litigants feel that they have been treated fairly."
Subrin, supra note 13, at 216. I would expand this to include not just litigants but all
disputants.
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The subjective perception of fairness is critical, because even assuming objec-
tive fairness, the system could not function well if it were perceived to be
unfair or unjust. Thus, it is rather shocking how little we actually know about
what disputants want, and what they perceive to be fair. As Professor Hensler
states, it is clear that more empirical research needs to be done.
4 2
Unfortunately, some people who opine on dispute resolution issues have a
tendency to say that they or we know what disputants really want, when in fact
the evidence is quite sparse. Thus, some mediation advocates overstate their
case, suggesting that most everyone would prefer a conciliated, non-legal solu-
tion to a trial. Along somewhat the same lines, an increasing number of judges
and lawyers tend to say that trials are terrible, and too much of an uncontrolla-
ble gamble for disputants, although it is not clear disputants actually share this
view. 3 Some lawyers feel it is their responsibility to educate disputants as to
the failings of our litigation system.4 4 At the same time, some trial advocates
also overstate their case, suggesting that most, or all, litigants would prefer to
resolve their disputes in the public and adversarial courtroom.
One important body of work, the procedural justice literature, does begin
to answer these questions.4 5 Drawing on laboratory and field research, these
studies have shown that perceptions of procedural justice are more influential
than perceptions of distributive justice, with respect to how disputants will
assess the fairness and legitimacy of the entire system.16 This rich literature
42 Hensler, supra note 19, at 95 ("The question of whether (and when) people prefer dispute
resolution based on public legal norms to dispute resolution based on ad hoc privately nego-
tiated norms unfortunately has not been subjected to much investigation to date."). See also
Bingham, supra note 25, at 122-23 (urging that further research be done to determine the
effectiveness of mediation, and that such research must take into account numerous differ-
ences in the ways mediation may be set up).
1 Judith Resnik discusses this phenomenon at length. See Resnik, Mediating Preferences,
supra note 23, at 156-59. She notes that "[j]udges repeatedly opine that 'a bad settlement is
almost always better than a good trial.'" Id. at 158 (quoting Hispanics United v. Village of
Addison, 988 F. Supp. 1130, 1149 (N.D. Ill. 1997)).
'4 Many repeat this famous statement from lawyer Abraham Lincoln: "Discourage litiga-
tion. ... Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you can. Point out to them how
the nominal winner is often the real loser - in fees, expenses, and waste of time." Abraham
Lincoln, Notes for a Law Lecture (July 1, 1850), in FREDERICK TREVOR HILL, LINCOLN THE
LAWYER 102 (1906). Judge Learned Hand's remarks to the same effect are also frequently
quoted: "I must say that as a litigant I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else
short of sickness and death." Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart
of the Matter, Address Before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Nov. 17,
1921), in 3 LECTURES ON LEGAL Topics 89, 105 (1926).
45 Much of the key work in this area has been done by Laurens Walker, John Thibaut, E.
Allan Lind, Tom R. Tyler, and their students or former students. See, e.g., Laurens Walker
et al., Reactions of Participants and Observers to Modes of Adjudication, 4 J. App. Soc.
PSYCHOL. 295 (1974); E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PRO-
CEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution:
Using Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 224, 247 (1993);
Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Models of the Justice Motive: Antecedents to Distributive and
Procedural Justice, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 850 (1994); Tom R. Tyler & E.
Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 65 (Joseph
Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001).
46 Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 26, at 817-18. Indeed, perceptions as to whether the
system is procedurally fair are likely to impact disputants' opinions of whether the result was
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has too often been neglected by persons setting up or analyzing systems of
justice.47 As Professor Nancy Welsh explains, procedural justice researchers
have found three key elements to disputants' experience of procedural justice:
(1) their perception that they had an opportunity to voice their concerns and
present evidence to a third party, and that they had some control over this pres-
entation; (2) their perception that the third party actually considered these con-
cerns; and (3) their perception that they were treated in a dignified and
respectful manner.48
Yet, while dispute resolution scholars are now beginning to focus on pro-
cedural justice,4 9 they are learning that more studies need to be done to assess
how particular approaches to dispute resolution are or might be viewed by dis-
putants. The existing studies allow expert researchers to draw quite disparate
conclusions from the same data. For example, Professor Hensler reviews the
procedural justice literature and concludes that disputants want third-party neu-
trals to resolve their disputes based on fact and law.5" In contrast, Professor
Welsh, having reviewed the same studies, questions Hensler's conclusion that
disputants view processes as more fair when they cede decisional control to a
third party. 5 ' Rather, argues Welsh, the studies show that "the locus of deci-
sion control is less important to litigants' perceptions of procedural justice than
process elements - voice, consideration, even-handedness and dignity."52 In
other words, we may be able to establish forms of ADR that meet disputants'
desires for procedural justice without having third-party neutrals make factual
and legal determinations.5 3
It is clear that additional research must be done on what disputants want
from a system of justice. It also seems intuitively obvious that disputants'
goals and desires will vary at least somewhat from society to society. While a
few studies on subjects from Hong Kong and Japan showed that they shared
certain procedural justice perspectives with United Sates subjects, 54 those stud-
substantively fair. Id. at 818. Most of these studies have been done in the United States,
but, as will be discussed, to some degree the results have been duplicated elsewhere.
47 Of course, as Professor Bingham points out, procedural justice literature is not the only
body of work that is or could be useful in evaluating the effectiveness of various approaches
to dispute resolution. Bingham, supra note 25, at 108.
48 Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 26, at 820.
49 See Hensler, supra note 19; Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 26.
50 Hensler, supra note 19, at 95.
51 Welsh, Disputants' Decisional Control, supra note 26, at 185.
52 Id. at 187.
51 Professor Welsh spells out some of the ways in which she believes procedural justice
principles should be applied to court-connected mediation in Welsh, Making Deals, supra
note 26, at 838-58 (concluding, for example, that disputants should not be excluded from the
mediation process, that joint sessions are important, that evaluative mediators should refrain
from giving issue evaluations too early, that disputants should have a chance for actual
brainstorming of creative agreements as opposed to template-based agreements, and that it is
critical that attorneys adequately express their clients' views or allow their clients to express
their own views).
51 See E. Allan Lind, Tom R. Tyler & Yuen J. Huo, Procedural Context and Culture: Vari-
ation in the Antecedents of Procedural Justice Judgments, 73 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 767,
777 (1997) (conducting research on U.S. and Japanese students and concluding "procedural
justice is defined in much the same way across widely different cultural contexts"); Kwok
Leung, Some Determinants of Reactions to Procedural Models for Conflict Resolution: A
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ies also revealed some important cultural differences." Moreover, a great deal
more work needs to be done to determine the dispute resolution preferences of
persons from countries more dissimilar to the United States.
Once this research has been conducted, I believe it will ultimately show
that disputants are generally looking for three benefits from a dispute resolution
system: (1) a system that provides them with a substantively fair/just result; (2)
a system that meets the procedural justice criteria of voice, participation, and
dignity as set out above; and (3) a system that helps them to achieve other
personal and emotional goals, such as reconciliation, or that at least does not
leave them feeling worse, emotionally and psychologically. The first two
points seem fairly obvious. It is hard to imagine that any system can be toler-
ated as fair and just in the long term if it in fact consistently yields unfair
results. In addition, although the social science literature on procedural justice
needs to be developed further, and while its applicability to other kinds of soci-
eties needs to be verified, as a preliminary matter, it seems clear that the per-
ception of justice is quite important to disputants.56
The third goal is the least obvious, at least to those of us who are used to
Western conceptions of justice. We recognize that disputants have emotional
needs and desires. They may seek revenge, forgiveness, or reconciliation,
among other things. However, we in the West have been trained to think that
these emotional needs should not necessarily be served by a system of justice,
or at least by a system of law.57 Instead, since the Enlightenment, we have
become accustomed to thinking of a justice system in an almost mechanical
fashion, as an institution designed to resolve disputes fairly, effectively, and
according to neutral legal principles. Yet, not all societies share this limited
Cross-National Study, 53 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCH. 898 (1987) (concluding that subjects from
both Hong Kong and the U.S. viewed adversarial procedures as the fairest ).
55 Kwok Leung et al., Effects of Cultural Femininity on Preference for Methods of Conflict
Processing: A Cross-Cultural Study, 26 J. Exp. Soc. PSYCH. 373 (1990) (comparing dispute
resolution preferences in high-masculinity culture, here Canada, to those of high-femininity
cultures, here the Netherlands, and concluding that the Dutch had a greater preference for
non-confrontational techniques than did the Canadians); Leung, supra note 54 (observing
that Hong Kong Chinese liked non-binding processes more than the American subjects, and
that American subjects liked adjudicatory procedures more than the Hong Kong subjects).
56 Professor Tyler has observed that disputants' interests may evolve as they interact with
the justice systems. Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social
Science Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 Am. J. COMP. L. 871, 894 (1997) ("Prior
to dealing with the courts people have an instrumental orientation toward their problem" and
"[flor example ... are strongly influenced by assessments about likely gain or loss. How-
ever, once people actually deal with legal authorities, their concerns change and they focus
more directly on issues of participation, trustworthiness, respect, and neutrality.").
57 Professors McThenia and Shaffer make a point that is related to mine, suggesting that
advocates of adjudication, such as Professor Owen Fiss, have defined justice too narrowly,
essentially defining it as law and the resolution of claims of rights. Andrew McThenia &
Thomas Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660, 1660-64 (1985). They suggest that
justice and law should not be equated, and that justice ought to include concepts such as
reconciliation. See id. at 1664-65 ("Justice is what we discover - you and I, Socrates said -
when we walk together, listen together, and even love one another, in our curiosity about
what justice is and where justice comes from."). Yet, in contrast to McThenia and Shaffer, I
see no reason why this broader conception of justice could not also be part of our system of
law. Also, in contrast to McThenia and Shaffer, my own views are not religiously based.
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vision as to the goals of a system of justice. Instead, many see the purposes of
justice more broadly, as bringing the members of society back into balance or
harmony.58 I believe there is no reason why we should not continue to have
our system of justice serve these emotional needs, as well as the other goals set
out above. Why should we not take into account psychological and emotional
factors, as well as other social policies, when we set up our legal system?
Surely these factors can be considered in drafting our legal procedures, just as
they are considered when we adopt substantive laws. Indeed, given the inevita-
bility that the manner in which we structure a system of procedure will impact
disputants, psychologically and emotionally, do we not have an obligation to
try to make this impact positive rather than negative?
D. We Need to Consider Societal as Well as Individual Interests in Setting
Up a System of Justice
The discussion above has focused on what individual disputants or mem-
bers of a society might want from a system of justice. While certainly relevant,
this should not be the only criterion as societies decide how to design their legal
institutions.5 9 The nature of our legal system has implications far beyond the
interests of the disputants involved in an immediate dispute, and I believe it is
important and possible to take account of both individual and societal interests.
As Steve Subrin puts it: "The very term 'dispute resolution' has bothered me
through the years because it implies that the central reason for adjudication is to
get rid of disputes, rather than concentrating on the application of law and vin-
dication of rights."6 ° Indeed, political philosopher Stuart Hampshire has
recently argued that "justice is conflict," suggesting that the process of airing
multiple perspectives serves the public interest.6 ' In economic terms, our sys-
tem of justice is a public good, and also imposes public costs.
For example, to serve the public good of justice, our legal system should
be designed to enforce the laws chosen by a society, and to help educate society
as to the meaning and scope of those laws. Using a formal legal system such as
courts, we can serve these interests by having legal disputes resolved publicly
through decisions that are broadly disseminated. The legal system should also
be designed in such a way that it earns the trust and respect of the society, or
else lawlessness and violence may occur. Thus, we need to ensure that the
system is sufficiently accessible and that it is perceived to treat like claims
equally.
" See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. In this section, I am emphasizing individ-
ual emotional concerns, distinct from societal concerns, which will be discussed below.
'9 Cf. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 38, at 2691 (recognizing that the design of a societal
dispute resolution system will differ depending on whether the system is designed to serve
only interests of disputants, or also those of society as a whole, and suggesting that, for her,
the individual interests are more important).
60 Subrin, supra note 13, at 216.
61 HAMPSHIRE, supra note 28. In particular, Hampshire urges that, whereas people will
likely never agree on substantive conceptions, the good "fairness in procedures for resolving
conflicts is the fundamental kind of fairness, and ... is acknowledged as a value in most
cultures, places and times." Id. at 4-5. For Hampshire, this fair process is an adversarial one
in which all sides are heard and arguments are balanced, and it corresponds to the internal
conversations that all individuals have with themselves. Id. at 8-9.
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At the same time, we must recognize that public trials can be very slow
and costly. These costs harm the public, which has an interest in efficiency,
and also harms particular disputants. Thus, it will not serve the public interest
to have all legal issues resolved through costly public trials. Negotiated or
mediated solutions will make more sense for some issues. As Carrie Menkel-
Meadow has eloquently explained, settlements can sometimes serve the public
interest in legal compliance as well or even better than could an adjudicated
solution.6 2
E. We Can Ask a System of Justice to Do More than Just Resolve Disputes
or Enforce Rights
The preceding section presents a conception of public interest that is too
narrow, in that it suggests that only one type of public good can be achieved by
a system of justice: resolving disputes in a fair and just manner through the
application of publicly selected laws and rights. As noted earlier, this is the
vision of justice that has evolved in the West since the Enlightenment: applying
laws neutrally to protect the rights of individuals.
Yet, as we consider the justice systems of other societies, we see that other
goals are possible. 63 Non-Western European societies have frequently counted
on their system of justice to help create balance, harmony, or reconciliation
among the members of the society. For example, James Wall and Ronda Cal-
lister have described the Ho'oponopono process, which they call "an integral
and ancient part of Polynesian culture," and which later migrated to Hawaii.
This process, used to resolve all manner of interpersonal and what would else-
where be criminal matters, typically consists of twelve steps ultimately geared
to untangle the disputants and make things right between them. Similarly, in
describing the Navajo system of justice, Robert Yazzie explains that concepts
of justice are closely related to concepts of healing, and that when Navajo
describe law, they say "life comes from it." Through a process of talking, and
community, they seek to work things out, as a community. 64 These concepts
62 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 38, at 2674, 2678-79 (urging that, as compared to litigated
solutions, settlements can sometimes more accurately reflect the legal complexities of a situ-
ation, and that settlements can also have precedential impact).
63 Occasionally, persons within our own society also urge these goals as well. See, e.g.,
Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation and Adjudication, Dispute Resolution and Ideology: An
Imaginary Conversation, 3 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 12 (1989) (suggesting that media-
tion may serve the public good by supporting a relational rather than an individualistic world
view); Lela P. Love, Images of Justice, 1 PEPP. Disp. REsOL. L.J. 29, 32 (2000) (explaining
that mediation can serve justice by allowing disputing parties to "tell their stories and explain
their feelings and values to each other in a manner that might enable one another to under-
stand more clearly and perhaps build or preserve their relationship"); Shaffer & McThenia,
supra note 57, at 1664-66 (urging that societal goals, such as reconciliation, peace and even
love, are appropriately considered part of our justice system).
64 Legal anthropologists, having studied numerous African, Asian, or even early American
societies, have often noted an emphasis on societal harmony throughout the world. See, e.g.,
JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? (1983) (examining informal and non-adver-
sarial forms of justice throughout American history); Nader, supra note 30, at 44-50 (dis-
cussing harmony models of justice in various countries in Africa and the Pacific, and citing
relevant literature); Laura Nader, Styles of Court Procedure: To Make the Balance, in LAW
IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY, supra note 28, at 69 (describing goals of Mexican Zapotec Indi-
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can also be traced to ancient Greece, where philosophers Aristotle and Plato
similarly emphasized the importance of all units of the society doing their part
and working well together.6 5
Is an emphasis on harmony possible or even appropriate in a modem
Western society? Some have suggested that a modem, mobile, capitalist soci-
ety cannot rely on the informal forms of dispute resolution that worked in non-
mobile, pre-capitalist societies." Critics have also pointed out that harmony
has its negative controlling aspects, as well as a potential positive allure.6 7
Without disagreeing with these perspectives, and without for an instant
suggesting that a modem system of justice should abandon its emphasis on
protecting rights and helping promulgate the law, I do believe that the modem
system of justice should also aspire to do more. I see no reason why an empha-
sis on protection of rights has to be exclusive of an emphasis on improving
relations among members of society. Why can we not look to our system of
justice to help members of society come to a better understanding of them-
selves, others, and what we can accomplish if we work together? I do not see
these goals as inconsistent with one another. Rather, in my view, we need to
strive for a proper mix among these and other goals as we design our system of
procedure.
ans to keep the society in balance, and restore personal relations to an equilibrium, and also
noting similarity to other societies that emphasize harmony). See also sources previously
discussed, supra notes 29-30.
65 See HAMPSHIRE, supra note 28, at 3 (explaining Plato's argument in the Republic that
"justice consists in a harmony of the parts or elements, a harmony imposed by reason");
Plato, The Republic Book IV, in GREAT DIALOGUES OF PLATO 271, 283 (W.H.D. Rouse
trans. 1961) (explaining justice as performance of proper role). See also THE POLITICS OF
ARISTOTLE BOOK III(C) 119 (Ernest Barker trans., 1977) (explaining that laws must do more
than merely protect rights; they must also promote good); McThenia & Shaffer, supra note
57, at 1665 ("Justice is what we discover - you and I, Socrates said - when we walk
together, listen together, and even love one another, in our curiosity about what justice is and
where justice comes from."). Of course, it is quite difficult to transfer the Greek concepts to
our own society. Translator Ernest Barker explains that the Greek word "Dike," often trans-
lated as justice, really means something more and different, perhaps something closer to
"righteousness," or taking the right or straight path. THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE, supra, at
lxix-lxxii.
66 See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, Introduction to THE POLITCS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra
note 28 (arguing that the characteristics of informal justice in precapitalist societies demon-
strate why comparable institutions cannot be recreated under Western capitalism, in that the
precapitalist society features a social structure in which relationships are multiplex and con-
tinuous, in which residential mobility is limited, and in which reputation is highly prized and
easily lost); Sally Engle Merry, The Social Organization of Mediation in Nonindustrial Soci-
eties: Implications for Information Community Justice in America, in THE POLITICS OF
INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 17, 33 (positing that mediation in urban America is
"more perfunctory, more delayed, and less concrete than mediation in small-scale societies"
because communities are fragmented and mobile, eluding the need to maintain cooperative
relationships and, thus, the impetus to resolve the dispute).
67 See, e.g., Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and
Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1
(1993).
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III. CONCLUSIONS
At best, the analysis set out above helps us think about what questions we
should ask, and what goals we should strive for in designing a procedural sys-
tem of justice. Yet, merely asking these questions is a significant step forward
as policy makers, and even law school professors, so rarely address the seem-
ingly foundational question of what the purposes should be of a dispute resolu-
tion system.
Of course, determining the appropriate goals and then designing the sys-
tem that best meets these goals will not be easy. Yet, I believe we have no
viable alternative to taking on the task. In my view, it would be a real mistake
either to simply allow our procedural system of justice to evolve on its own,68
or to focus unduly on certain goals while ignoring others. As we first try to
assess our goals for a system of justice, and then design the system that fulfills
these goals, I believe policy makers will benefit from considering the interre-
lated nature of various types of dispute resolution, the preferences of dispu-
tants, and the multiple societal interests that are and can be served by a
procedural system of justice.69 It may well be appropriate to have a procedural
system with multiple components in order to serve our multiple goals.7 °
Of course, if we devise a system that contains multiple procedures (e.g.
both litigation and mediation), we will also have to solve the additional prob-
lem of determining how and by whom the choice should be made as to which
disputes should be handled under which process.7 1 I agree with Professors
Subrin, Hensler, and Resnik that it is important for society to encourage judges
to judge in certain cases. 72 However, I also see great value to using non-adju-
68 Professor Carrington's essay condemning the phenomenon of mandatory binding arbitra-
tion in the U.S. can be viewed in this light. Carrington, supra note 18. Allowing one set of
disputants, businesses, to set up the form of dispute resolution that best serves their own
interests may not serve the interests of the other disputants nor of society as a whole. For
these reasons, the practice needs to be closely regulated.
69 In some cases, we may well determine that a particular form of dispute resolution does
not serve any of our interests. Although I agree with Professor Brunet that judges will
necessarily impact disputants' settlement posture through their rulings, speech, and body
language, I fear that encouraging or allowing judges to mediate their own cases is not likely
to serve the interests of either the disputants or society as a whole. Brunet, supra note 17.
70 Whereas Professor Subrin makes the point that both mediation and judging are valuable, I
would add that mediation should be valued not only because it is a good means for exploring
legal rights, but also because it can help achieve other aspects of justice. See Subrin, supra
note 13. For example, mediation can help disputants and their lawyers learn that it is possi-
ble to advocate a position, while simultaneously listening to others and trying to engage in
cooperative problem solving. Id. See also Jean R. Sternlight, In Search of the Best Proce-
dure for Enforcing Employment Discrimination Laws: A Comparative Analysis (draft, on file
with author) (arguing that both formal and informal dispute resolution processes are impor-
tant to allow us to serve our goals in enforcing laws prohibiting employment discrimination).
71 In a somewhat different context, Professors Sander and Goldberg called this the problem
of "fitting the forum to the fuss." Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the
Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49
(1994).
72 See Subrin, supra note 13; Hensler, supra note 19, at 96-99; Resnik, Trial as Error,
supra note 23, at 1024-31.
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dicative approaches in many situations.7 3 Who decides which disputes go
where? Elsewhere I have called this the problem of finding the appropriate
"switching" mechanism, to choose between multiple dispute resolution
tracks."4 Professor Menkel-Meadow has suggested it may well be impossible
to determine, in advance, which disputes should be handled by which pro-
cess.75 Yet, while I agree with Professor Menkel-Meadow that it is probably
hopeless to try to assign cases to one process or another based on a set of pre-
determined criteria, we must find a way of making such determinations. If we
do not use pre-determined criteria, we must at least decide who will make these
determinations, and on what basis. 7
6
In short, we have our hands quite full as we try to assess where ADR does
and should fit in a system of justice. I certainly do not have all the answers, but
I do urge that we think about justice broadly as we examine these questions.
ADR is exciting in part because it allows and encourages us to move beyond
our existing conceptions. Without abandoning what is precious about our legal
system, we must also be open to new possibilities as we begin to rethink our
approach to procedural justice.
71 While Professor Hensler contends that veering away from fact and law should not occur
inside the courthouse doors, I doubt that sharp lines can really be drawn between those types
of mediation that are and are not law and fact based. Hensler, supra note 19, at 196-99.
However, even if those lines could be drawn, I see no inherent reason why "justice" has to
mean only decisions based on fact and law.
71 See Sternlight, supra note 70.
75 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 38, at 2694 n.139 ("I have abandoned any notion that we
can assign cases ex ante to particular processes.").
76 A major question is whether it should be disputants themselves who select the process, or
whether the larger society should play a role in this decision. Because disputes and dispute
resolution affect the public as well as disputants, I believe this should be, in part, a societal
decision, and not merely left to disputants.
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